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Note  
Establishing an “Injury-in-Fact” through 
Valuations of Ecosystem Services: Putting It in 
Terms Federal Courts Understand 
 
Allie Jo Mitchell* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Environmental public interest organizations, 
conservationists, and those seeking to vindicate nature for 
human-caused damages know all too well the difficulties that lie 
in seeking justice in the American court system. Environmental 
harms, like air pollution, are often diffuse, making it difficult to 
trace the harm back to its source or properly apportion fault.1 
Causation is also difficult to establish in cases where the 
environmental damage occurs years or decades later.2 
Furthermore, environmental harms may injure hundreds of 
thousands of people, or in the case of climate change, the entire 
world.3 
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 1. See Adam D.K. Abelkop, Tort Law as an Environmental Policy Instru-
ment, 92 OR. L. R. 381, 404–05 (2013) (describing the problem of the diffuse 
harms on indeterminate plaintiffs that cannot ascertain the harm attributable 
to any one defendant); see also id. at 407 (illustrating the problem of a diffuse-
origin externality like CO2 emissions on plaintiff’s ability to establish both gen-
eral and specific causation). 
 2. See id. at 400 (raising the issue of latent toxicological harms that are 
often “removed in both time and space from the defendant’s risky activity.”). 
 3. See id. at 405 (highlighting three difficulties that arise from diffuse-
harm externalities that affect a large number of people: (1) aggregate damage 
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Despite all of these difficulties, one important doctrine 
works to keep environmental lawsuits out of U.S. federal courts 
altogether—Article III standing. By restricting federal court 
jurisdiction to only “cases or controversies,” the standing 
doctrine works as a bar to plaintiffs who are unable to allege an 
injury-in-fact that is causally related to the defendant’s conduct 
and is redressable by a favorable decision of the court.4 To meet 
this initial hurdle, different standing theories have emerged 
from case law and scholarship, although each has proven to have 
its own limitations and drawbacks.5 
The jurisdictional limits placed on the judiciary exist to 
protect the executive and legislative branch from usurpation by 
the only unelected branch of government.6 Notwithstanding 
these valid concerns, federal courts have a “virtually unflagging 
obligation” to exercise the jurisdiction given to them7 as the 
branch of government tasked with the protection of the rights 
and privileges of the people.8 In contravention of this duty, the 
standing doctrine has proven incredibly effective at preventing 
environmental plaintiffs from obtaining their due justice in the 
federal court system.9 Because of this, vindication for public 
                                                        
may be great but individual harm may be small; (2) high transaction costs; (3) 
collective action hurdles). 
 4. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) 
(articulating the three requirements under the standing doctrine). 
 5. See infra Part I.C. 
 6. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), at ¶ 9 
(“[L]iberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have 
everything to fear from its union with either of the other departments . . . .”), 
with Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861) (“[T]he candid 
citizen must confess that if the policy of the government, upon vital questions 
affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme 
Court . . . the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that 
extent practically resigned their government into the hands of that eminent 
tribunal.”). 
 7. Colo. Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). 
 8. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The government of 
the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not 
of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws 
furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”). 
 9. See Marisa A. Martin & James Landman, Standing: Who can Sue to 
Protect the Environment?, 19 A.B.A. INSIGHTS (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/insights-
on-law-and-society/insights-vol—19—-issue-1/standing—who-can-sue-to-
protect-the-environment-/ (“In practice, however, developing a principled basis 
upon which standing can be demonstrated has proven to be extremely difficult, 
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interest and collective environmental rights has shifted “to the 
more steeply pitched fields of state courts or the political 
process.”10 
This Note proposes a new tool in the environmental 
standing arsenal for plaintiffs seeking to “fight the good fight”11 
on behalf of the natural world—ecosystem service valuations 
(ESVs). Ecosystem services first made a splash in the late 1990s 
as an attempt to illustrate and link the benefits human society 
receives from the natural world.12 The applications and uses for 
ecosystem services has expanded greatly since then, including 
the ability to determine the monetary value ecosystem services 
provide.13 By using existing models, valuation techniques, and 
platforms, litigators can now more easily link environmental 
harms to actual or imminent and concrete and particularized 
injuries to humans to overcome the burden of establishing an 
injury-in-fact. 
Part I of this Note introduces the relevant background 
information on the standing doctrine, ecosystem services, and 
the valuation of these ecosystem services. This section will first 
explain how standing requirements were judicially developed 
through the Case or Controversy Clause in Article III of the 
Constitution. Next, Part I will explore the difficulties 
environmental plaintiffs have faced meeting these standing 
requirements. This Note will use the seminal cases Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife and Sierra Club v. Morton as examples and 
give an overview of three commonly proposed environmental 
standing theories: (1) the traditional standing theory; (2) the 
ecosystem nexus theory; and, (3) the intrinsic value of nature 
                                                        
especially for those cases involving environmental issues.”); see also Access to 
Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The ability within a society 
to use courts and other legal institutions effectively to protect one’s rights and 
pursue claims. — Also termed access to the courts.”). 
 10. Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of 
Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 606 (1992). 
 11. John Samuel Bewley Monsell, Fight the Good Fight, in HYMNS OF LOVE 
AND PRAISE FOR CHURCH’S YEAR (1863). 
 12. See James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 
888 (1997) (“Although awareness of ecosystem services dates back to Plato, only 
recently have ecologists and economists begun systematically examining the 
contribution of ecosystem services to social welfare.”). 
 13. Cf. Paul Sutton, Can You Put a Dollar Value on Nature, WORLD ECON. 
F. (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/03/can-you-put-a-
dollar-value-on-nature/ (explaining how and why attempts have been made to 
put a dollar value on nature). 
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theory. Part I will conclude with an overview of ecosystem 
services, ESV methods, and the application of ecosystem services 
and standing in the law today. 
Part II considers the limitations of the three commonly 
proposed environmental standing theories (traditional, 
ecosystem nexus, and “intrinsic value of nature” theories). This 
section will then propose the use of ESVs as a tool to meet Article 
III injury-in-fact standing requirements. Part II will conclude by 
applying the proposed ESV methodology to cases that failed 
under each one of the commonly proposed standing theories: 
traditional, ecosystem nexus, and “intrinsic value of nature.” 
I. BACKGROUND 
This Part introduces the standing doctrine and ecosystem 
services. Section A explores the rise of the standing doctrine and 
articulates the three judicially developed elements a plaintiff 
must meet to bring a lawsuit in federal court. Section B provides 
a summary of landmark cases in the environmental standing 
field. Section C discusses three theories advanced in scholarship 
and case law to establish standing in environmental lawsuits. 
Section D explains what ecosystem services are and how to value 
them using ecosystem service assessments, also known as 
ecosystem service valuations. Section E concludes Part I with a 
discussion on the current application of ecosystem services in the 
law today. 
A. ARTICLE III AND THE “CASE OR CONTROVERSY” STANDING 
REQUIREMENTS 
The standing doctrine is employed by federal courts to 
determine whether it has power, or jurisdiction, to hear the 
plaintiff’s case.14 It derives from the Constitution’s limit of 
federal court jurisdiction to only “cases and controversies.”15 
Many courts and scholars have interpreted this restriction as a 
derivative of separation of powers principles.16 As Alexander 
                                                        
 14. See Francisco Benzoni, Environmental Standing: Who Determines the 
Value of Other Life?, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 347, 356 (2008) (explaining 
that a federal court’s jurisdiction can be invoked when the plaintiff meets 
federal standing requirements). 
 15. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2 (extending federal judicial power to certain 
“cases” or “controversies”). 
 16. See Brian A. Stern, An Argument Against Imposing the Federal Case or 
Controversy Requirement on State Courts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 77, 92 (1994) (“By 
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Hamilton argued in the Federalist Papers, separation of the 
judiciary power from the legislative and executive powers was 
necessary to prevent against the rise of a monarchy.17 
In order to protect the separation of powers principles at 
play in the Case or Controversy Clause, the Judiciary developed 
minimum requirements that must be met for a plaintiff to bring 
a lawsuit in federal court.18 This came to be known as the 
standing doctrine and is considered by federal courts as 
“constitutionally required and jurisdictional in nature.”19 
Standing is often interpreted as a limitation on the judiciary’s 
power, ensuring that federal courts do not preside over an issue 
that is better suited for remedy by the legislative or executive 
branch.20 
The modern standing requirements were first articulated by 
the Supreme Court in the 1970s in a series of cases21 and 
highlighted in the seminal standing case Lujan v. Defenders of 
                                                        
limiting their sphere of action to cases and controversies, federal courts respect 
the separation of powers by not interfering unnecessarily with the other 
branches of government.”); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 
(1972) (explaining that standing protects against “judicial review at the behest 
of organizations or individuals who seek to do no more than vindicate their own 
value preferences through the judicial process.”). 
 17. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), at ¶ 9 (“For I agree, 
that ‘there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the 
legislative and executive powers.’”) (quoting MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS 
181 (1748)). 
 18. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 701 (2011) (“Article III of the 
Constitution grants this court authority to adjudicate legal disputes only in the 
context of ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’”). 
 19. See Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s 
Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 186 (2012) (citing Hein v. Freedom 
from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 611 (2007) (“The 
constitutional requirements for federal-court jurisdiction—including the 
standing requirements and 
Article III—’are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of 
powers.’”) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 
(1998)). 
 20. See Stern, supra note 16, at 93 (“Article III defines the role of the 
federal courts, and thereby prevents those courts from exercising powers more 
properly left to the legislative and executive branches . . . .”). 
 21. See Lee & Ellis, supra note 19, at 175–76 (listing Supreme Court 
opinions from the 1970s that expounded standing requirements including 
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39–44 (1976), Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 494–504 (1975), and Linda R.S. v. Richard, 410 U.S. 614, 616–18 
(1973)). 
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Wildlife.22 Ultimately, to confer standing a plaintiff must assert 
an injury-in-fact (which the Court articulated as the invasion or 
violation of a legally protected interest), there must be causal 
connection between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s 
conduct complained of, and the injury must be capable of being 
redressed by a favorable decision.23 These three elements can be 
summarized as: (1) injury-in-fact; (2) causation; and (3) 
redressability.24 Although the causation and redressability 
prong are important elements to the standing doctrine and have 
kept many environmental lawsuits out of court, they are outside 
the scope of this Note.25 
i. Injury-in-Fact 
The Supreme Court has provided additional guidance 
regarding what an injury-in-fact must entail. According to 
Lujan, an injury-in-fact must be “concrete and particularized” 
(as opposed to a generalized grievance) and “actual or imminent” 
(not conjectural or hypothetical).26 This essentially puts the 
burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the injury is personal 
to them and has either already occurred or is “imminent.”27 Suits 
have been withheld from court under the “actual or imminent” 
requirement for being either temporally deficient (the harm will 
occur too far in the future) or too conjectural (there is not a 
sufficient probability of the harm occurring).28 “With respect to 
                                                        
 22. 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Lee & Ellis, supra note 21, at 176 (“[T]he [Supreme] Court made it 
clear that Article III requires a plaintiff to demonstrate three things in order to 
maintain any action in federal court: injury-in-fact, causation, and 
redressability.”). 
 25. There is expansive scholarship in this field, including research on ways 
ecosystem services can be used to prove proximate causation in environmental 
tort suits. See, e.g., Sanne H. Knudsen, The Long-Term Tort: In Search of a New 
Causation Framework for Natural Resource Damages, 108 NW. L. REV. 475, 
480–84 (2014) (explaining the difficulties in proving causation for natural 
resource damages and advocating for a new remedy for long-term ecological 
injuries, adoption of a lenient version of the substantial factor test). 
 26. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 27. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he 
burden [to show standing] grows as the litigation progresses.”). 
 28. See Fero v. Excellus Health Plan, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 735, 753 
(W.D.N.Y 2017) (finding that plaintiffs that were victims of a data breach but 
had yet to experience any misuse of their personally identifiable information 
did not have an imminent or “certainly impending” harm arising from an 
increased risk of future injury); see also Lee & Ellis, supra note 19 at 176–80 
2019] ESTABLISHING AN "INJURY-IN-FACT" 445 
 
injury in fact, ‘[t]he relevant showing for purposes of Article III 
standing . . . is not injury to the environment but injury to the 
plaintiff.’”29 
Recently, in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins the Supreme Court 
confirmed that the “concrete” factor of injury-in-fact must be de 
facto (actually exist) and not “abstract.”30 Therefore, a mere 
procedural violation of a statute without a de facto injury will 
not establish Article III standing.31 However, the Court also 
confirmed that an injury can be intangible and that “history and 
the judgment of Congress play important roles” in determining 
whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact.32 
Allegations of a mere procedural violation often come up in 
environmental lawsuits when a plaintiff attempts to bring a 
claim under a citizen suit provision of a federal statute.33 The 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) contains such a provision, which 
grants the public the right to sue defendants for violation of the 
statute.34 However, federal courts have refused to adjudicate 
ESA citizen suit cases if the plaintiff lacks an actual injury and 
can only raise a procedural violation of the statute.35 
The “showing of [an] individual injury has proven to be the 
most difficult element for environmental activists to show 
                                                        
(explaining the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the “concrete and 
particularized” and “actual or imminent” injury-in-fact requirements). 
 29. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Schroer, No. 3:14-cv-589-HBG, 
2017 WL 943942, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. 2017) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)). 
 30. 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). 
 31. Id. at 1549. 
 32. Id. at 1549 (“Congress may ‘elevat[e] . . . injuries that were previously 
inadequate in law.’”) (quotation omitted). 
 33. See, e.g., Navajo v. Dep’t of Interior, 876 F.3d 1144, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 
2017) (explaining the procedural protections granted under the National 
Environmental Policy Act) (“NEPA”)); Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t. of 
Agric., 795 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2015) (analyzing plaintiff’s standing to 
bring a procedural claim for a violation of NEPA). 
 34. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2012) (“Except as provided in paragraph (2) 
of this subsection any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf . . . to 
enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental 
instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision 
of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority thereof . . . .”). 
 35. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 34 F. 
Supp. 3d 50, 60 (2014) (citing Fla. Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 667 
(D.C.Cir.1996) (“To establish standing to challenge the Service’s failure to abide 
by a statutory procedure, Plaintiffs must show that the procedures in question 
are “designed to protect some threatened concrete interest” of their members.”). 
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during the litigation process” as many environmental harms 
affect a vast array of individuals.36 However, despite this 
difficulty courts have found that an injury-in-fact may stem from 
environmental harms that impact many individuals. For 
example, in Sierra Club v. Morton, the Court held that injury-
in-fact could include harm to the aesthetics of nature so long as 
the plaintiff had personally visited the place in question to enjoy 
its beauty.37 Justice Stewart also warned against denying 
plaintiffs standing just because the harm impacts a large 
number of people in United States v. Students Challenging 
Regulatory Agency Procedures.38 
It is important to note that the judicially-developed Article 
III standing requirements only apply to federal courts.39 State 
courts are not bound by the federal constitutional mandate that 
restricts federal court jurisdiction to only “cases or 
controversies.”40 Instead, each state court’s jurisdictional limits 
are defined either by the state’s constitution or other state 
legislation.41 While federal courts can only hear cases or 
controversies, state courts can hear anything their legislature 
grants them jurisdiction to adjudicate over.42 This Note only 
addresses the standing requirements of federal courts. 
                                                        
 36. Trayce A. Hockstad, Rats and Trees Need Lawyers Too: Community 
Responsibility in Deodand Practice and Modern Environmentalism, 18 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 105, 118 (2016). 
 37. 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972). 
 38. 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) (“But we have already made it clear that 
standing is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same 
injury.”). 
 39. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1992) (“[S]tate courts 
are not bound to adhere to federal standing requirements . . . .”). 
 40. Id. (“We have recognized often that the constraints of Article III do not 
apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the 
limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even 
when they address issues of federal law . . . .”). 
 41. See Calvin Massey, Standing in State Courts, State Law, and Federal 
Review, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 401, 404–05 (2015) (“[S]tates are free to set their 
own standing rules independent of the Article III limits on standing applicable 
to federal courts . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 42. Id. at 409 (explaining that a state legislature could expand standing by 
authorizing any citizen to assert a generalized grievance in state court). 
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B. LANDMARK CASES ON ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING 
Many environmental cases have lost based on a failure to 
establish standing.43 As the Environmental Law Practice Guide 
states, “[s]tanding to institute a legal action is a vital issue in 
environmental litigation, where plaintiffs often lack the 
pecuniary injury that furnishes standing in most civil 
litigation.”44 This note will discuss two landmark cases that have 
shaped the field of environmental standing: Lujan and Sierra 
Club. Later this Note will use the fact pattern in Lujan to 
demonstrate how the plaintiffs may have been able to allege a 
more concrete and colorable standing argument by using an ESV 
methodology. 
i. Sierra Club v. Morton 
Sierra Club v. Morton is a formative case that centered 
around the Disney company’s plans to turn Mineral King Valley, 
a scenic wilderness area in the Sequoia National Forest 
designated as a national game refuge, into a mega ski resort.45 
The Forest Service approved Disney’s plan in 1969 under what 
would be a 30-year use permit from the Forest Service.46 
Following this, Sierra Club sued “as a membership corporation 
with ‘a special interest in the conservation and the sound 
maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests’” 
and sought a declaratory judgment that various aspects of the 
proposed development violated federal laws and regulations 
protecting national parks, forests, and game refuges.47 The 
Sierra Club centered its right to challenge the Forest Service’s 
action under the citizen suit provision of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) which reads “[a] person suffering legal 
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or 
                                                        
 43. See William Blake Ogden, Improving Standing Doctrine to Better 
Protect the Environment: How the United States Can Learn from Ecuador’s 
Rights of Nature, 46 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2 (“Standing requirements are 
viewed as the ‘most persistent constitutional quandary for environmental 
law.’”) (citing Holly Doremus, The Persistent Problem of Standing in 
Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10956 (2010)). 
 44. PHILLIP WEINBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE 
§ 11B.03(1) (Michael B. Gerrard ed., Matthew Bender) (2018). 
 45. 405 U.S. 727, 728–29 (1972). 
 46. Id. at 729. 
 47. Id. at 730. 
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aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”48 
The Supreme Court stated the proper inquiry to analyze 
Sierra Club’s standing to sue was “whether the statute in 
question [APA] authorizes review at the behest of the 
plaintiff.”49 Based on precedent,50 the Court laid out one of the 
now familiar standing requirements it found the APA required: 
an “injury in fact.”51 While the Court acknowledged that harm 
to scenic, aesthetic, or environmental well-being “may amount to 
an ‘injury in fact’ sufficient to lay the basis for standing,” it also 
made clear that the “party seeking review [must] be himself 
among the injured.”52 
That a plaintiff must show a particularized injury to herself, 
is now well known in the environmental law landscape.53 
Because Sierra Club failed to show that any of “its members 
use[d] Mineral King for any purpose,” or “in any way that would 
be significantly affected by the proposed actions of the [Forest 
Service/Disney],” the Court found it had not met federal 
standing requirements.54 Ultimately, Sierra Club failed in its 
attempt to allege standing based on its status as a 
“representative of the public” in a case concerning the use of 
natural resources for the public.55 The “representative theory” 
was in direct opposition to the limitation that federal courts only 
review cases in which there are parties with direct stakes in the 
outcome.56 Sierra Club’s holding had significant ramifications on 
how, and which, environmental lawsuits were brought in federal 
court and it created the traditional standing strategy in which 
environmental nonprofits identify a member of their 
                                                        
 48. Id. at 732–33 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012)). 
 49. Id. at 732 (citations omitted). 
 50. See id. at 733–34 (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs, Inc. v. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970)). 
 51. Id. at 734. 
 52. Id. at 734–35. 
 53. See WEINBERG, supra note 44, § 11B.03(1)(b) (“In drafting a complaint 
on behalf of an environmental group, it is becoming critically important to 
assert definite injury, or impending injury, to members of the group in the most 
specific terms.”). 
 54. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735. 
 55. Id. at 729, 736, 740. 
 56. Id. at 740. 
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organization particularly affected by the issue[s] they are 
challenging.57 
ii. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 
Another seminal environmental standing case, decided 
twenty years after Sierra Club, is Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife.58 In Lujan, plaintiffs were members of the non-profit 
Defenders of Wildlife (“Defenders”).59 The plaintiffs challenged 
a Department of the Interior (DOI) regulation limiting the scope 
of the Endangered Species Act’s consultation requirement to 
only projects or activities that occurred inside the United States 
or on the high seas.60 Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires each 
federal agency to consult with DOI to ensure “any action 
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence [or habitat] of any 
endangered species or threatened species.”61 Previously, DOI 
had interpreted this provision of the ESA as requiring 
consultation for agency activities both domestically and 
abroad.62 Upon DOI’s publication of its new regulation in 1986, 
the Defenders brought suit seeking a federal court injunction 
requiring DOI to promulgate a new regulation based on its 
initial interpretation.63 
The Supreme Court focused on two specific plaintiffs, Joyce 
Kelly and Amy Skilbred, each of whom the Court of Appeals 
found had a sufficient injury-in-fact to meet standing 
requirements.64 Each plaintiff alleged a risk of future injury 
stemming from U.S. agencies funding and involvement in dam 
projects aboard.65 The first project of concern was the 
                                                        
 57. See, e.g., Lee & Ellis, supra note 19, at 188 (“In Lujan, the lawyers for 
Defenders of Wildlife assembled declarations in an effort to surmount this 
requirement.”). 
 58. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 59. See id. at 559, 563. 
 60. See id. at 558–59 (“A revised joint regulation, reinterpreting § 7(a)(2) to 
require consultation only for actions taken in the United States or on the high 
seas, was . . . promulgated in 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 19926; 50 CFR 402.01 (1991).”). 
 61. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (incorporating what has come to be known as 
the consultation requirement). 
 62. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 558–59 (1992). 
 63. Id. at 559. 
 64. Id. at 563. 
 65. Id. 
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rehabilitation of the Aswan Dam on the Nile river.66 The Aswan 
Dam threatened the habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile, a 
species that plaintiff Kelly, a conservation biologist, had 
observed before and hoped to see again in the future.67 
The second project of concern was the Mahewali Dam 
project in Sri Lanka.68 Plaintiff Skilbred, who had traveled to the 
project area of the Mahewali Dam in Sri Lanka to study and 
observe endangered Asian elephant and leopards, testified that 
the Dam could “seriously reduce endangered, threatened, and 
endemic species habitat.”69 She went on to conclude that this 
threat harmed her as she planned on returning to Sri Lanka to 
observe and study the Asian elephant and leopards in the 
future.70 
The Supreme Court focused on the testimony of Kelly and 
Skilbred and determined that both had failed to demonstrate 
both an “actual or imminent” and concrete injury.71 The majority 
reasoned that even if the agency-funded dams threatened the 
listed species, plaintiffs affidavits contained no facts showing 
damage to the species would result in an “imminent” injury to 
themselves.72 Justice Scalia opined that both Kelly and 
Skilbred’s affidavits, which professed general intentions to 
return to Egypt and Sri Lanka to observe and study the 
endangered species instead of concrete or specific plans to do so, 
supported a finding that no “actual or imminent” injury had 
occurred.73 
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that although the ESA 
contained a citizen suit provision, the plaintiffs were still 
required to allege an injury-in-fact to themselves that was actual 
and imminent and not a generalized grievance.74 Under the 
standing doctrine, injury or harm to a threatened species is not 
                                                        
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. (quoting Plaintiff Skilbred’s testimony). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 564. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. at 578 (“[Statutory] broadening [of] the categories of injury that 
may be alleged in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the 
requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an 
injury.”) (citation omitted). 
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enough without an individual tie or injury to the alleged action.75 
Lujan illustrated the rising burden plaintiffs have to meet to 
properly allege an injury-in-fact, shifted the way environmental 
lawsuits were brought, and inspired a new wealth of scholarship 
specifically addressing environmental standing requirements.76 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING PROPOSALS TO DATE 
The difficulty environmental plaintiffs face in establishing 
standing has spurred a vast array of legal scholarship. For 
example, a Westlaw search for the term “environmental 
standing” shows a return of 436 law review and journal articles. 
Three common theories discussed in this scholarship are 
explained below: first the traditional standing theory, second the 
ecosystem nexus theory, and third the intrinsic value of nature 
theory. 
i. Traditional Standing Theory 
What this Note will call the traditional standing theory was 
established after Sierra Club v. Morton.77 Public interest 
organizations, like Sierra Club or Defenders of Wildlife, look for 
members of its organization that will be personally and 
adversely affected by a federal action or that have already faced 
environmental harm from a third party.78 Examples of common 
                                                        
 75. See id. at 567 (“It goes beyond the limit, however, and into pure 
speculation and fantasy, to say that anyone who observes or works with an 
endangered species, anywhere in the world, is appreciable harmed by a single 
project affecting some portion of the species with which he has no more specific 
connection.”). 
 76. A Westlaw search for secondary sources with titles including “Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife” returned twenty-four law review and journal articles, one 
CLE & seminar material, and one text & treatise. 
 77. See Bradley James Larsen, Meeting the Requirements of Standing: A 
Framework for Environmental Interest Groups: Lujan v. National Wildlife 
Federation, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990), 14 HAMLINE L. R. 277, 297–98 (1990) 
(explaining a framework for environmental litigators to follow to allege 
standing including: (1) find an individual whose aesthetic, recreational, or 
environmental interests have actually been harmed; (2) follow Sierra Club v. 
Morton as a guideline and show that the plaintiff “use[s] the land for aesthetic 
or recreational purposes such as hiking, hunting, and bird watching” and; (3) 
redress each harm on a case-by-case basis); see also WEINBERG, supra note 44, 
§ 11B.03 (providing a guideline for practitioners seeking to establish standing 
in an environmental lawsuit in federal court). 
 78. See Larsen, supra note 77, at 297 (“[T]ime and money should be spent 
on finding this individual [injured plaintiff] instead of wasting valuable 
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suits in this area include members that will be harmed based on 
a loss of recreation or aesthetic values from human development 
or extraction in a national forest,79 a conservationist or biologist 
whose career will be negatively impacted by an adverse agency 
action,80 or an individual whose property or health have been 
harmed from environmental degradation (e.g. fisherman who 
lost income following the Exxon Valdez oil spill).81 Public 
interest organizations will then allege an injury tied to its 
particular member’s career, hobby, interest, health, or 
property.82 
Although in many environmental lawsuits it is not difficult 
to find a plaintiff to meet these requirements, that is not always 
the case. For example, in Lujan, based on the holding in Sierra 
Club, Defenders of Wildlife attempted to find members of their 
organization who were personally aggrieved by DOI’s action.83 
However, the Supreme Court found that the members’ affidavits 
failed to allege a sufficient injury-in-fact because they could not 
establish when they would be harmed without any concrete 
plans to return to the areas of concern.84 Because of these 
                                                        
resources bringing an action based on an individual whose connection to the 
public land is tenuous at best.”). 
 79. See e.g., Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 102–03 (D. Ala. 1971) 
(reviewing lawsuit to enjoin sale of timber in Tongass National Forest brought 
by, among other plaintiffs, “eighty Sierra Club members, many of whom enjoy 
the timber sale area for scenic and recreational purposes such as hunting, 
fishing, camping, hiking and canoeing”). 
 80. See e.g., Sharps v. U.S. Forest Serv., 823 F. Supp. 668, 671, 673 (D.S.D. 
1993) (reviewing wildlife biologist’s challenge of Forest Service’s management 
of prairie dog populations in the Nebraska National Forest claiming it would 
result in a loss of swift fox species which he studies). 
 81. See In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing 
appeal from a $5 billion punitive damage award stemming from economic harm 
to commercial fisherman following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William 
Sound, Alaska). 
 82. See e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1992) (“Of 
course, the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic 
purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing. ‘But the 
‘injury in fact’ test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It 
requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.’”) (quoting 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)). 
 83. See e.g. Lee & Ellis, supra note 19, at 188 (“In Lujan, the lawyers for 
Defenders of Wildlife assembled declarations in an effort to surmount this 
requirement [set in Morton.]”). 
 84. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (“Such ‘some day’ intentions—without any 
description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some 
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inherent limitations, plaintiffs and scholars have pushed for the 
courts to accept other theories of standing. 
ii. Ecosystem Nexus 
In Lujan, attorneys for the plaintiffs went a step beyond the 
traditional method and attempted to allege standing based on 
an ecosystem nexus theory. As the brief describes it, 
Defenders possesses standing based upon the injury suffered by its 
members who use and enjoy any part of a contiguous ecosystem affected 
by federal action for purposes of studying or observing endangered 
species located in that ecosystem, even if the federal agency action 
which is damaging those interests is located some distance away from 
the tracts used by Defenders’ members.85 
The theory held that because the international projects 
would have ripple effects across the ecosystems in which they 
were to be built, the plaintiffs could assert an injury based on 
the harm that would occur in a remote unvisited area of the 
ecosystem.86 Even if this remote area was not directly tied to the 
plaintiff’s interest, harm to the remote area would ultimately 
affect the entire ecosystem, including the portion on which the 
plaintiffs claimed a particularized interest.87 Therefore, 
Defenders attempted to link the degradation of one portion of 
the ecosystem to a substantial likelihood that one of the member 
plaintiffs particularized interest would be harmed.88 
Justice Scalia dismissed this premise as a “novel” and 
“inelegantly styled” standing theory.89 In the Court’s view, the 
ecosystem nexus theory was not aligned with precedent that 
held “a plaintiff claiming injury from environmental damage 
                                                        
day will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our 
cases require.”). 
 85. Brief for the Respondents, Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 
(1992) (No. 90-1424), 1991 WL 577004, 
at *27 (Aug. 30, 1991) (emphasis added). 
 86. Id. at *28 (providing plaintiff’s testimony that “[t]he area that I visited 
and the area of the Picchis-Palcazu project are contiguous areas of tropical 
moist forest and reducing the population in one area affects the population in 
its entirety”). 
 87. See id. (arguing that the “level of generality at which injury can occur” 
is the ecosystem level based on the ESA’s declaration of purpose in section 2). 
 88. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 (“The first, inelegantly styled ‘ecosystem nexus,’ 
proposes that any person who uses any part of a ‘contiguous ecosystem’ 
adversely affected by a funded activity has standing even if the activity is 
located a great distance away.”). 
 89. Id. 
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must use the area affected by the challenged activity and not an 
area roughly ‘in the vicinity of it.’”90 Although the ESA’s stated 
purpose was to conserve ecosystems upon which endangered and 
threatened species depend, the Court did not equate this 
purpose to granting rights of action in “persons who use portions 
of an ecosystem not perceptibly affected by the unlawful act in 
question.”91 
iii. Intrinsic Value of Nature 
Another standing theory advanced centers around the idea 
that nature has intrinsic value and thus should be granted legal 
rights, the damage of which should be recognized by courts as 
sufficient to grant standing.92 This theory was put forth by 
Christopher Stone in 1972 in his article Should Trees Have 
Standing.93 Stone argued that natural objects should be 
appointed lawyers or guardians ad litem to advance their legal 
rights (as is common practice for children, those deemed 
“incompetent,” or other non-human entities like corporations, 
estates, and universities).94 Stone’s theory finds support by the 
works of Aldo Leopold in which he argued for recognition of “the 
land ethic”—an expansion of traditional ethics beyond humans 
to include all of the Earth.95 “In Leopold’s vision of a land 
ethic, . . . care for people cannot be separated from care for the 
land.”96 
                                                        
 90. Id. at 565–66 (citing omitted). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward 
Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 456 (1972) (proposing 
that legal rights should be given to natural objects and the natural environment 
as a whole). 
 93. See Hockstad, supra note 36, at 117 (referencing Stone’s seminal law 
review article: “it was not until 1972 that this argument [for protection in the 
form of legal rights] was made for inanimate objects in the environment.”). 
 94. See Stone, supra note 92, at 464. 
 95. See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 238 (1949) (“There is as 
yet no ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants 
which grow upon it . . . . The land-relation is still strictly economic, entailing 
privileges but not obligations.”). 
 96. See The Land Ethic, THE ALDO LEOPOLD FOUND., 
https://www.aldoleopold.org/about/the-land-ethic/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2019); see 
also LEOPOLD, supra note 95, at 262 (“A thing is right when it tends to preserve 
the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it 
tends otherwise.”). 
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Since 1972, similar scholarship has been produced arguing 
that nature should be granted standing based on its intrinsic 
value as opposed to any benefits it confers to an individual. Some 
of this work has looked outside of the United States to countries 
that have enacted legislation granting nature standing or have 
incorporated nature’s rights into its constitution. For example, 
in 2018 William Blake Ogden proposed that the United States 
should look to Ecuador’s Right of Nature97 to advance 
environmental standing doctrine.98 Similarly, advocates have 
argued for legislation resembling New Zealand’s that granted 
the Whangauni River, a sacred river considered an ancestor to 
the Maori tribe, rights of personhood and appointed a committee 
to act as guardians for the river.99 Closer to home, the White 
Earth band of Ojibwe recently granted legal rights to wild rice, 
a native grain in Minnesota that has important cultural and 
spiritual significance to the tribe.100 
Based on the theory first advanced by Stone—that natural 
objects should possess legal rights in and of themselves—a 
lawsuit was recently filed in federal district court listing the 
Colorado River Ecosystem as a party in its own right.101 
                                                        
 97. Ogden, supra note 43, at 7–8 (explaining how Article 71–74 of the 2008 
Constitution of Ecuador granted legal rights to nature). 
 98. See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR [CONSTITUTION OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR], Oct. 20, 2008, arts. 71–74 (granting standing 
rights to anyone in Ecuador seeking to protect nature and enshrining nature’s 
rights “to integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and 
regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions, and evolutionary 
processes.”). 
 99. See Mihena Tanasescu, Rivers Get Human Rights: They Can Sue to 
Protect Themselves, SCI. AM. (June 19, 2017), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/rivers-get-human-rights-they-can-
sue-to-protect-themselves/; see also Advancing Legal Rights of Nature: 
Timeline; COMMUNITY ENVTL. LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://celdf.org/rights/rights-
of-nature/rights-nature-timeline/ (last updated Jan. 31, 2019). 
 100. See Jennifer Bjorhus, Minnesota Tribe Asks: Can Wild Rice Have its 
own Legal Rights?, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 9, 2019), 
http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-tribe-asks-can-wild-rice-have-its-own-
legal-rights/505618712/ (“[T]he state’s largest Indian tribe, the White Earth 
Band of Ojibwe, has passed a tribal law granting wild rice its own enforceable 
legal rights, much like those enjoyed by American citizens.”). 
 101. See Allison Katherine Athens, An Indivisible and Living Whole: Do We 
Value Nature Enough to Grant it Personhood?, 45 ECOLOGY L. Q. 187, 191, 193 
(2018) (explaining attempts to expand legal rights to nature and ultimately 
arguing that “nature . . . has intrinsic value and thus should be entitled to legal 
personhood”) (citing Stone, supra note 92, at 456); see also Complaint at ¶ 
4, Colo. River Ecosystem v. Colorado, No. 1:17-cv-02316, 2017 WL 4284548 (D. 
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Following filing of the lawsuit, attorney Jason Flores-Williams 
withdrew the complaint after threats of sanctions and 
disbarment.102 The Colorado Attorney General issued a 
statement stating the suit was correctly dismissed with 
prejudice because “the case itself unacceptably impugned the 
State’s sovereign authority to administer natural resources for 
public use, and was well beyond the jurisdiction of the judicial 
branch of government.”103 
D. WHAT ARE ECOSYSTEM SERVICES & HOW CAN YOU VALUE 
THEM? 
i. Ecosystem Services 
Simply put, ecosystem services are the tangible benefits 
that ecosystems provide to humans.104 Defined more specifically 
by James Salzman in A Policy Maker’s Guide to Designing 
Payments for Ecosystem Services ecosystem services are “the 
interactions of living organisms with their 
environment . . . [that] provide both the conditions and 
processes that sustain human life.”105 Examples of the ecosystem 
services required to produce a natural good, like apples, are 
pollination, pest control, and soil fertility.106 Other examples of 
ecosystem services are flood mitigation benefits provided by 
                                                        
Colo. Sept. 25, 2017) (“Through this action, the Plaintiffs are asking this Court 
to recognize and declare that the Colorado River is capable of possessing rights 
similar to a ‘person’ . . . .”). 
 102. Athens, supra note 101, at 191 (citing Chris Walker, Attorney to 
Withdraw Colorado River Lawsuit Under Threat of Sanctions, WESTWORD (Dec. 
4, 2017), http://www.westword.com/news/colorado-river-lawsuit-to-be-
withdrawn-due-to-potential-sanctions-9746311). 
 103. Chris Walker, Attorney to Withdraw Colorado River Lawsuit Under 
Threat of Sanctions, WESTWORD (Dec. 4, 2017), 
http://www.westword.com/news/colorado-river-lawsuit-to-be-withdrawn-due-
to-potential-sanctions-9746311. 
 104. See Anna Maria Carcamo, A New Democratic Approach to Ecosystem 
Service Valuation: An 
Experiment in New Hampshire, YALE ENV’T. REV. (Apr. 23, 2018) (“Ecosystem 
services are benefits that ecosystems provide to humans.”). 
 105. JAMES SALZMAN, A POLICY MAKER’S GUIDE TO DESIGNING PAYMENTS 
FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 4 (Aug. 27, 2009); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The 
Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 
157, 157 (2007). 
 106. SALZMAN, supra note 105. 
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wetlands107 or carbon sequestration by forests.108 Ecosystem 
services are broken down into four categories under the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment109: 
(1) provisioning services (products obtained from ecosystems); (2) 
regulating services (benefits obtained from the regulation of ecosystem 
processes); (3) cultural services (the non-material benefits that people 
obtain from ecosystems through spiritual enrichment, cognitive 
development, reflection, recreation, and aesthetic experiences) that 
directly affect people and; (4) supporting services needed to maintain 
other services.110 
“Ecosystem service valuation [ESV] is a method for 
assigning economic value” to these ecosystem services.111 It is 
essentially a “methodology for identifying environmental 
benefits created by ecosystems” and then calculating the 
monetary value these benefits provide.112 ESVs can help define 
the monetary benefits an ecosystem service provides to society 
or, alternatively, the costs or damages that result from the 
destruction of an ecosystem service.113 
ii. Economic Valuation Approach 
Ecosystem services are valued in a variety of ways, but one 
well-known framework is the economic value approach. The 
economic value approach measures both use and nonuse values 
derived from ecosystems.114 Use values include physical 
                                                        
 107. See John K. Pattinson-Williams et al., Wetlands, Flood Control and 
Ecosystem Services in the Smith Creek Drainage Basin: A Case Study in 
Saskatchewan, Canada, 147 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 36, 37–38 (2018); J.B. Ruhl & 
R. Juge Gregg, Integrating Ecosystem Services into the Law: A Case Study of 
Wetland Mitigation Banking, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 365, 366 (2001). 
 108. SALZMAN, supra note 105, at 4. 
 109. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment was a global study involving 
1,360 experts to assess “the consequences of ecosystem change from human 
well-being.” Five technical volumes and six synthesis reports appraise “the 
conditions and trends in the world’s ecosystems and the services they provide.” 
About the Millennium Assessment, MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, 
https://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/About.html# (last visited Mar. 5, 
2019). 
 110. SALZMAN, supra note 105, at 5. 
 111. Carcamo, supra note 104; see also Sutton, supra note 13 (describing 
recent estimates that put the total global value of ecosystem services (US$125 
trillion) at twice as much as the world’s gross domestic product (US$75 trillion)). 
 112. Ori Sharon et al., Ecosystem Services and Judge-Made Law: A Review 
of Legal Cases in Common Law Countries, 32 ECOSYSTEM SERVS. 9, 16 (2018). 
 113. See id. 
 114. BRUCE PEACOCK, NAT’L PARK SERV., VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES IN 
NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS 6 (2009), 
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interactions with ecosystems both currently and in the future 
and are divided into two subsets consumptive use values and 
non-consumptive values.115 Consumptive use values include 
activities like hunting and fishing while non-consumptive use 
values include activities like wildlife viewing and hiking.116 Non-
use values on the other hand are derived independently from any 
physical interaction with ecosystems.117 For example, the value 
a person gains from merely knowing that an ecosystem exists or 
will be preserved.118 
Different methods employed to calculate use and nonuse 
values include; travel cost,119 contingent valuation,120 conjoint 
analysis,121 and willingness to pay.122 In a willingness to pay 
evaluation an individual will be asked how much they would be 
                                                        
https://conference.ifas.ufl.edu/aces08/presentations/Acacia5-
6/Tuesday/pm/(2)%20B%20Peacock.pdf; see also Sharon et al., supra note 112, 
at 10 (explaining how natural resource economists use both use values and non-
use values to consider the economic welfare benefits of nature). 
 115. PEACOCK, supra note 114 at 12–13. 
 116. Id. at 12. 
 117. Id. at 13. 
 118. See Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(recognizing non-use values as potentially valid components of damage 
assessment awards). 
 119. See Ivana Logar, Travel-Cost Method, ENVTL. JUST. ORG., LIABILITIES 
& TRADE, http://www.ejolt.org/2013/01/travel-cost-method/ (last visited Mar. 6, 
2019) (describing how the travel-cost method can be used to calculate the 
economic value of environmental goods by measuring the total costs, including 
time and opportunity costs, that a person will spend to visit a or use the natural 
good). 
 120. See Ivana Logar, Contingent Valuation, ENVTL. JUST. ORG., LIABILITIES 
& TRADE, http://www.ejolt.org/2012/12/contingent-valuation/ (last visited Mar. 
6, 2019) (measuring the benefits provided by ecosystem services by asking 
“representative sample of the concerned local population how much they would 
have been willing to pay (in the forms of taxes for instance) in order” to receive 
the services and then “adding these results over the whole population” to get a 
“monetary representation of the benefits obtained”). 
 121. See DAVID A. HARPMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INTRODUCTION 
TO CONJOINT ANALYSIS FOR VALUING ECOSYSTEM AMENITIES (2008), 
https://www.usbr.gov/tsc/techreferences/economics/conjoint/TMEC200803.pdf 
(“Conjoint analysis is based on a primary survey of individuals utilizing a 
carefully designed survey instrument. Respondents are presented with 
different hypothetical situations, described using their characteristics or 
attributes and asked either to rank them or choose between them. Using the 
resultant survey data, the probability that an individual will rank or choose any 
particular scenario is then estimated. The consumer surplus or net economic 
value of the amenity can then be derived.”). 
 122. See PEACOCK, supra note 114, at 6. 
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willing to pay to benefit from an ecosystem service, e.g.—to see 
the Grand Canyon and enjoy its aesthetic beauty.123 However, 
because of the varied and wide-ranging figures this question can 
produce, researches sometimes ask the opposite question—how 
much an individual would have to be paid never to utilize the 
ecosystem service—or in the example posed, to never see the 
Grand Canyon or enjoy its beauty.124 Flipped around, this is 
known as willingness to accept.125 
iii. Ecosystem Service Valuation Platforms & Tools 
There are a variety of resources, platforms, and models that 
have been developed to assist with ESV.126 This Note will refer 
to these collectively as ESV platforms. The goal of these 
platforms is to reduce the cost and time to preform full ESVs in 
order to integrate the true value of ecosystem services into 
decision making, planning, management, and payment for 
ecosystem service markets.127 
These tools utilize publicly accessible environmental data, then model 
the amount of services provided by a target ecosystem service using 
coefficients obtained from other studies. Compared to economic 
valuation models, these tools can provide quick estimation at a large 
scale, while maintaining a relatively low cost in terms of both time and 
money.128 
Examples of some well-known and established ESV 
platforms are the: Ecosystem Valuation Toolkit from Earth 
Economics,129 Integrated Valuation of Ecosystem Services and 
                                                        
 123. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., VALUING 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: TOWARD BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING 48 
(2005), https://www.nap.edu/read/11139/chapter/1 (explaining how willingness 
to pay and willingness to accept are used in economic valuations of 
environmental goods). 
 124. See id. at 48–49. 
 125. See id. at 49. 
 126. See generally PAUL BURGESS, SIYU QIN & XIANGYI LI, MANGROVES IN 
ECUADOR—AN APPLICATION AND COMPARISON OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 
VALUATION MODELS 14 (2015), 
https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/9597/Burgess%
20Qin%20Li%20MP.pdf?sequence=1 (studying and comparing different 
ecosystem service valuation models on the market to calculate the value of 
ecosystem services from Ecuador’s mangroves). 
 127. See id. (explaining how the development of tools and models are 
intended to promote implementation of ESV). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Ecosystem Valuation Toolkit, EARTH ECON., 
http://www.eartheconomics.org/ecosystem-valuation-toolkit/ (last visited Mar. 
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Tradeoffs (InVEST),130 and the UN-REDD (Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing 
Countries) Programme.131 These resources can be used by 
governments, nongovernmental organizations, researchers, or 
individuals looking to accurately calculate the value of an 
ecosystem (e.g. a specific river basin) or a particular resource of 
interest (e.g. coastal shoreline). 
A study by Paul Burgess, Siyu Qin, Xiangyi Li compared a 
number of these platforms by using each to complete an 
ecosystem services assessment to calculate the value of 
Ecuador’s mangroves. One of the platforms used in the study to 
calculate the value of blue carbon storage and coastal protection 
Ecuador’s mangroves provided was InVEST.132 InVEST was 
developed by the Natural Capital Project133 and has fifteen 
different models covering different ecosystem services including 
carbon storage and sequestration, crop pollination, habitat risk 
assessment, sediment retention, and coastal vulnerability.134 It 
is a suite of open-source software models that uses maps and 
spatial data inputs (i.e. amount of crop cover or forest cover) to 
return “results in either biophysical terms (e.g., tons of carbon 
                                                        
6, 2019) (“Our Ecosystem Valuation Toolkit (EVT) is a comprehensive, 
searchable database of ecosystem service values. The quantity and quality of 
our data and the advanced filtering and reporting tools we’ve developed allow 
Earth Economics to quickly and reliably generate ecosystem service values for 
virtually any location and ecosystem in the world.”). 
 130. What is InVEST, NAT. CAPITAL PROJECT, 
https://naturalcapitalproject.stanford.edu/invest/#what-is-invest (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2019) (“InVEST is a suite of free, open-source software models used to 
map and value the goods and services from nature that sustain and fulfill 
human life.”). 
 131. UN-REDD Programme, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un-redd.org/ 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2018) (creating a financial value for carbon stored in forests 
and then paying developing countries the social costs saved from their 
reductions in carbon emissions from deforestation). 
 132. BURGESS, QIN & LI, supra note 126, at 32–35. 
 133. Natural Capital Project is a partnership between Stanford University, 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the University of Minnesota, the Stockholm 
Resilience Center, The Nature Conservancy, and the World Wildlife Fund that 
works to improve the well-being of all people and nature by motivating greater 
and more targeted natural capital investments. Who We Are, NAT. CAPITAL 
PROJECT, https://naturalcapitalproject.stanford.edu/what-is-natural-
capital/#who-we-are (last visited Apr. 6, 2019). 
 134. What is InVEST, supra note 130. 
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sequestered) or economic terms (e.g., net present value of that 
carbon sequestered).”135 
Burgess’ study found that InVEST was one of the most 
useful platforms to analyze the value of mangroves in Ecuador, 
as it first calculated the amount of biophysical goods the 
mangroves produced, then estimated the social benefits 
generated from the mangroves, and finally converted these into 
market based values, social preferences, and coefficients adopted 
from other studies.136 InVEST also allows users to “adjust and 
manipulate the assumptions used in the model, thereby allowing 
the measurement of ecosystem services under different natural 
or socio-economic conditions.”137 Using InVEST the study 
calculated that “the current mangroves in Ecuador can 
sequestrate over twenty three metric tons of carbon over 20 
years, which will avoid a social cost of $378 million.”138 
E. ECOSYSTEM SERVICES IN THE LAW TODAY 
Ecosystem services are not a new concept. Since the late 
1990s there has been a growing volume of literature in the 
area.139 Early on, scholarship focused on explanations on what 
ecosystem services were, debates over proper valuation methods, 
and advocating for the application of ecosystem services in 
ecological management.140 It has since evolved into calls for the 
incorporation of ecosystem services into decision making, 
common law claims, and marketplaces to pay for ecosystem 
services.141 
                                                        
 135. Id. 
 136. BURGESS, QIN & LI, supra note 126, at 20. 
 137. What is InVEST, supra note 130. 
 138. BURGESS, QIN & LI, supra note 126, at 33. 
 139. Sharon et al., supra note 112, at 11 (“[A] search for the term “ecosystem 
services” in Westlaw’s Law Reviews and Journals database shows that the 
number of articles using the term grew from 16 to 1427 in the twenty-year time 
span from 1995 to 2015.”). 
 140. See Salzman, supra note 12, at 887–88 (explaining how our very 
survival depends on the services that Earth’s ecosystem provides). 
 141. See SALZMAN, supra note 105, at 15, 20–40 (describing how successful 
payment for ecosystem services markets can be designed). For a detailed 
comprehensive review of the world’s payment for ecosystem services programs, 
see generally James Salzman et al., The Global Status and Trends of Payments 
for Ecosystem Services, 1 NATURE SUSTAINABILITY 136, 136 (2018) (“In economic 
terms, PES [payments for ecosystem services] seeks to internalize the positive 
externalities (that is, the third-party benefits) generated by natural systems, 
creating incentives for landholder behavior that ensures service provision.”). 
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Ecosystem services have also started to appear in different 
areas of the law, in the form of federal decision making,142 
natural resource damage assessments,143 and settlement and 
damage calculation frameworks.144 Even more recently 
“[p]laintiffs have successfully used ecosystem services 
terminology to express the form of injury needed to establish 
standing.”145 In Ellis v. Bradbury,146 Plaintiffs alleged standing 
by describing the loss of ecosystem services that would result 
from EPA’s continued approval of pesticides, including lost 
utilization of habitats that the impacted pollinators provided.147 
The Court held that these interests were sufficient to confer 
standing.148 
                                                        
 142. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS & AGENCIES ON INCORPORATING 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES INTO FEDERAL DECISION MAKING (2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/ 
memoranda/2016/m-16-01.pdf (directing “agencies to develop and 
institutionalize policies to promote consideration of ecosystem services, where 
appropriate and practicable, in planning, investments, and regulatory 
contexts.”). 
 143. A codified system of recovery for ecosystem services exists under six 
environmental federal statutes: CERCLA; CWA; OPA; NMSA and; PSRPA. 
Karen Bradshaw, Settling for Natural Resource Damages, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 211, 227 (2016). 
 144. In Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) carefully considered an environmental 
damages compensation lawsuit against Nicaragua for lost ecosystem services 
resulting from degradation of 6.3 hectares of wetland 300 uprooted trees. Jim 
Salzman, International Court of Justice Recognizes and Values Ecosystem 
Services (Sort of), LEGALPLANET (Feb. 6, 2018), http://legal-
planet.org/2018/02/06/international-court-of-justice-recognizes-and-values-
ecosystem-services-sort-of/ (summarizing the case and explaining its 
importance for expansion of ecosystem services in the law). Earth Economics, a 
natural capital valuation company, even offers workshops on how to apply ESV 
to calculate legal damage assessments. Workshops and Training, EARTH ECON., 
http://www.eartheconomics.org/workshops-and-training (last visited Mar. 6, 
2019). 
 145. Sharon et al., supra note 112, at 13. 
 146. 2014 WL 1569271 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2013). 
 147. Complaint at ¶ 32, Ellis v. Bradbury, No. C131266, 2014 WL 1569271 
(No. C131266), 2013 WL 1164622 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2013). (“Plaintiffs and their members have personally 
visited the ranges of directly impacted ESA-listed invertebrates’ and ‘enjoy 
utilizing those species for recreational, aesthetic, and other uses, and intend to 
continue to visit those habitats and enjoy those species and the ecosystem 
services they provide.”). 
 148. Ellis v. Bradbury, 2014 WL 1569271, at *13–14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 
2013). 
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However, in Public Employees for Environmental 
Responsibility v. Schroer (“PEER”) the Court dismissed 
plaintiff’s complaint that the Tennessee Department of 
Transportation’s failure to comply with its CWA 404 permit 
wetland mitigation plan was harming his aesthetic, 
recreational, and wildlife preservation interests in Cherokee 
Lake.149 The Plaintiff attempted to relate his injury to the loss 
of ecosystem services the wetlands in question provide to 
Cherokee Lake.150 The Court found that plaintiff had failed to 
demonstrate an actual individualized injury as opposed to a 
generalized grievance.151 
A study reviewing cases in common law countries that 
addressed the concept of ecosystem services explained that 
substantial differences between the two plaintiffs standing 
claims resulted in the opposite results—namely the “nature of 
the proceeding, the alleged harm, and the resource at stake.”152 
In Ellis the plaintiffs used the ecosystem service terminology to 
describe protected interests that have long been recognized as 
conferring standing (recreational, aesthetic, existence value, and 
pollination interests).153 However, in PEER the plaintiffs used 
the ecosystem services terminology to describe a form of injury 
not a protected interest.154 Comparing these two cases, the study 
concluded that 
plaintiffs seeking to establish standing based on assertions of a factual 
link between (1) a reduction in ecosystem services . . . and (2) a 
concrete injury to a specific individual, should put forward careful and 
specific allegations that tie the harmful action as closely as possible to 
the alleged injury.155 
                                                        
 149. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Schroer, No. 3:14-cv-589-HBG, 
2017 WL 943942, at *5 (E.D. Tenn., 2017) (quoting Plaintiff’s Declaration) (“I 
am concerned that the insufficiency of the wetlands mitigation at issue in this 
case could be affecting the health of Cherokee lake and interfering with my 
aesthetic, recreational and wildlife preservation interest in this river system.”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Sharon et al., supra note 112, at 14. 
 153. See id. 
 154. PEER, 2017 WL 943942 at *5 (alleging damage to ecosystem services 
from degradation of wetlands that helped support the health and viability of the 
Cherokee watershed where plaintiff recreated). 
 155. Sharon et al., supra note 112, at 14. 
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II. ANALYSIS 
While the three common standing theories discussed in 
Section I—traditional standing theory, ecosystem nexus 
approach, and intrinsic value of nature theory—all have their 
strengths, they are each limited by their applicable scope and 
ability to prove an “actual or imminent” and “concrete and 
particularized” injury-in-fact. Section A will highlight the 
circumstances and scenarios where each of the three standing 
proposals has failed. Applying ESVs as a tool to remedy these 
gaps provides a potential solution to see fewer environmental 
lawsuits dismissed under the Article III standing doctrine. 
Section B will provide examples for how the application of an 
ESV methodology in a standings analysis can sufficiently meet 
the three elements of an injury-in-fact: (i) actual or imminent; 
(ii) concrete; and; (iii) particularized. Section C will analyze the 
potential for ESVs to remedy the gaps found in each one of the 
standing proposals described by this Note by applying it to a 
scenario where the commonly used theories have previously 
failed. 
A. LIMITATIONS OF PRIOR PROPOSALS TO ESTABLISH 
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING 
i. The traditional standing theory often fails to find a plaintiff 
who has suffered a concrete harm and an individual, not 
generalized, grievance.   
Under the traditional standing theory, public interest 
organizations, like Sierra Club or Defenders of Wildlife, look for 
members of their organizations that will be personally and 
adversely affected by a federal action targeting the environment. 
Alternatively, they look for members who have already 
experienced environmental harm from a potential defendant. 
Although the traditional environmental standing theory is often 
sufficient, it has its limitations and weaknesses. For example, it 
can be difficult to find the “right” plaintiff for cases in which an 
environmental harm occurs in a remote area or to a rare species 
that does not directly relate to a person’s livelihood, research, or 
recreational interest.156 
                                                        
 156. See, e.g., Diogo Verissimo & Bob Smith, When it Comes to Conservation, 
Are Ugly Animals a Lost Cause, SMITHSONIAN (June 27, 2017), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/are-ugly-animals-lost-cause-
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If it appears no plaintiff is affected by the environmental 
harm, the organization cannot meet the “injury-in-fact” 
requirement.157 This limitation was highlighted in Lujan when 
Defenders of Wildlife were unable to identify a plaintiff the court 
found was sufficiently injured from the government’s funding of 
international dam projects, despite affidavits from Kelly and 
Skilbred (both with professional backgrounds in wildlife 
preservation) that described how they had visited, observed, and 
planned to return to see endangered species potentially 
impacted from the Aswan and Mahewali Dam.158 
Furthermore, it can be difficult to prove a particularized 
environmental harm under the traditional standing theory if the 
harm is diffuse in nature and affects larger groups of people. A 
common example of a diffuse environmental harm is air 
pollution. Upon emission, the air pollutant disperses over wide 
areas; for example, carbon molecules spread across the entire 
globe after they are emitted into the air.159 Although the harm 
to each individual may be small, the aggregate social costs may 
be huge; but in order to challenge the polluter in court an 
individual must be identified with both a particularized and 
significant injury.160 Therefore, even if it appears that a plaintiff 
can be identified under the traditional standing theory that will 
meet the “actual or imminent” and “concrete” requirements of 
the standing doctrine, establishing that the injury is personal to 
them can be challenging. 
                                                        
180963807/ (explaining the plight of ugly or obscure threatened and endangered 
species). 
 157. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs., Inc., 528 
U.S. 167, 181 (2000) (“[It] is not injury to the environment but injury to the 
plaintiff” that will confer Article III standing). 
 158. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992); see id. at 592 
(Blackmun, J. dissenting). 
 159. See Abelkop, supra note 1, at 407 (illustrating the problem of a diffuse 
pollutants like CO2 emissions in environmental law contexts). 
 160. See id. at 404 (“Diffuse effects do not afflict single and discretely 
identifiable plaintiffs. Rather, they affect large populations of individuals—
many of whom may not even know that they are affected—over wide geographic 
areas.”). 
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ii. The expansive scope of the ecosystem nexus theory makes 
it difficult for courts to connect the injury in one portion of the 
ecosystem to the plaintiff’s injury. 
Defenders of Wildlife also faced challenges in Lujan when it 
claimed plaintiffs had suffered an adequate injury-in-fact under 
the “ecosystem nexus theory of standing.”161 The Supreme Court 
dismissed this theory as being “inelegantly styled” and 
“inconsistent” with its precedent that held an injury stemming 
from environmental damages had to occur in an area actually 
affected by the challenged activity and not an area roughly “in 
the vicinity” of it.162 Despite Defenders’ efforts to broaden 
environmental standing to account for the interconnected 
characteristics of ecosystems and nature,163 the Court found that 
this was too broad an expansion of the standing doctrine.164 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Lujan illustrates the exact 
problems with the Supreme Court’s rejection of the ecosystem 
nexus theory: 
Many environmental injuries, however, cause harm distant from the 
area immediately affected by the challenged action. Environmental 
destruction may affect animals traveling over vast geographical 
ranges, see, e.g., Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean 
Society, 478 U.S. 221, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (harm to 
American whale watchers from Japanese whaling activities), or rivers 
running long geographical courses, see, e.g., Arkansas v. 
Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 112 S.Ct. 1046, 117 L.Ed.2d 239 (1992) (harm 
to Oklahoma residents from wastewater treatment plant 39 miles from 
border).165 
Damages in one portion of an ecosystem can ricochet, 
causing distant yet immense and significant harm to species, 
aesthetic value, recreational lands, and more.166 If a plaintiff is 
                                                        
 161. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 (dismissing plaintiffs’ alternative theories of 
standing). 
 162. Id. at 565–66 (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 887–
89 (1990)). 
 163. See id. at 565; see also Andrew Becker, Four Basic Components of an 
Ecosystem, SCIENCING (Apr. 23, 2018), https://sciencing.com/four-basic-
components-ecosystem-9557.html (“Ecosystems represent the interconnected 
nature of living organisms and their world.”). 
 164. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565. 
 165. Id. at 594 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). 
 166. See id. (explaining how pollution can spread far from the initial area of 
discharge and yet still cause significant damages); see also Forest Die-Offs 
Ricochet to Distant Ecosystems, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Nov. 16 , 2016), 
https://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=190154 (“According to a 
paper published today in the journal PLOS ONE, wiping out an entire forest 
2019] ESTABLISHING AN "INJURY-IN-FACT" 467 
 
required to show geographical proximity under an ecosystem 
nexus theory, many environmental harms and plaintiffs who 
wish to prevent them will not see their day in court. As 
Blackmun’s dissent states, the majority’s opinion could be read 
as precluding litigants who fail to “use the precise or exact site 
where animals are slaughtered or where toxic waste is dumped 
into a river” as a basis for standing.167 
iii. Because of the potential breadth of standing under the 
intrinsic value of nature theory, courts are hesitant to grant 
legal rights to nature. 
The last common standing theory discussed by this Note is 
the intrinsic value of nature theory which argues that an injury 
to animals, the environment, or natural resources should confer 
standing without requiring a link to a human injury or 
enterprise.168 If the natural world has intrinsic value, then it 
should also be granted the ability to sue in its own right.169 This 
theory has potential to be the most protective of nature.170 After 
all, if nature has intrinsic value then it cannot be replaced with 
a man-made or artificial resource that accomplishes the same 
thing.171 Unfortunately, while this theory is exalted by those as 
                                                        
can have significant effects on global climate patterns and alter vegetation on 
the other side of the world.”). 
 167. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 595 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). 
 168. See Susan Emmenegger & Axel Tschentscher, Taking Nature’s Rights 
Seriously: The Long Way to Biocentrism in Environmental Law, 6 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 545, 550 (“In the third stage [of international environmental law 
development], the anthropocentric approach is transcended by the recognition 
of an intrinsic value of nature, i.e. a value independent of human interest.”). 
 169. See Stone, supra note 92, at 456 (proposing that legal rights should be 
given to natural objects and “the natural environment as a whole”). 
 170. From an ethical perspective, it is also the theory this Author is most 
inclined to agree with. 
 171. See Ronald Sandler, Intrinsic Value, Ecology, and Conservation, 
NATURE, https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/intrinsic-value-
ecology-and-conservation-25815400 (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) (discussing why 
the fields of ecology and conservation should be guided by a theory recognizing 
the intrinsic value of nature). 
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high as Pope Francis172 and has seen success in New Zealand173 
and Ecuador,174 it has failed to achieve similar recognition in the 
American court system.175 
There are a number of reasons why America’s judiciary has 
chosen not to follow the path of these other nations. Trayce A. 
Hockstad discussed common arguments and philosophical 
difficulties the intrinsic value of nature theory imposes in her 
Note, Rats and Trees Need Lawyers Too: Community 
Responsibility in Deodand Practice and Modern 
Environmentalism.176 According to Hockstad, humanity has long 
distinguished itself from animals and nature based on 
humankind’s rationality and free will.177 By granting nature 
inherent legal rights, Hockstad argues, we would skew these 
long-held distinctions.178 This would inevitably lead to debates 
and arguments over the varying degrees of autonomy different 
species hold.179 
                                                        
 172. See Pope Francis, Encyclical Letter, Laudato Si’ of the Holy Father 
Francis on Care for Our Common Home ¶ 84 (May 24, 2015), 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-
francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html (“Each creature has its own 
purpose. None is superfluous. The entire material universe speaks of God’s love, 
his boundless affection for us. Soil, water, mountains: everything is, as it were, 
a caress of God.”). 
 173. See Tanasescu, supra note 99 (explaining how New Zealand made the 
Whanganui River a person under law). 
 174. See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR [CONSTITUTION OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR], Oct. 20, 2008, arts. 71–74. 
 175. See, e.g., Colo. River Ecosystem v. Colorado, No. 1:17-cv-02316, 2017 
WL 4284548 (D. Colo. Sept. 25, 2017) (threatening sanctions and disbarment if 
case not withdrawn). But see, Order to Show Cause, The Nonhuman Rights 
Project v. Breheny, No. 18-45164 (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.courthousenews.com/ny-judge-grants-habeas-order-for-bronx-zoo-
elephant/ (follow “order” hyperlink) (ordering respondent, Executive Vice 
President of Bronx Zoo, to show cause why Happy, an elephant at the Bronx 
Zoo, should not be released from Respondent’s custody to an appropriate 
sanctuary). 
 176. Hockstad, supra note 36, at 122–25. 
 177. Id. at 123. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See, e.g., Christine Stuart, NY Judge Grants Habeas Order for Bronx 
Zoo Elephant, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Nov. 19, 2018), 
https://www.courthousenews.com/ny-judge-grants-habeas-order-for-bronx-zoo-
elephant/ (explaining how the Nonhuman Rights Project relied on Happy’s 
cognitive abilities—she was the first elephant known to successfully pass the 
self-recognition mirror test—as reasoning for why she should be protected from 
being labeled a “thing” and granted a habeas petition to free her from the 
confines of the Bronx zoo). 
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Another reason courts have not accepted the intrinsic value 
of nature theory is based on their deference to states sovereignty.  
In the Complaint filed on behalf of Colorado’s River Ecosystem, 
the concern over granting a river in Colorado the rights to sue in 
its own name centered around the prerogatives of the state of 
Colorado as a sovereign entity.180 Few, if any, courts would wish 
to adopt a legal theory that could restrict the sovereignty of the 
state or federal government to enact policies and laws for fear of 
harming natural resources. Indeed, the courts made their 
opposition to this theory known when the attorney was forced to 
withdraw the suit under threats of sanctions and disbarment.181 
The potential expansive scope of an intrinsic value of nature 
theory could send many judges off on a “parade of horribles” 
analysis as well.182 One can easily imagine a Supreme Court 
Justice partaking in the familiar practice of pushing an attorney 
to see how far their legal theory could be stretched.183 For 
example, a court may ask, “if a river has standing in its own right 
to sue the government for failure to protect its rights to flow 
what is to stop a ‘concerned citizen’ from bringing suit on behalf 
of a squirrel that was negligently run over?”184 
                                                        
 180. See Complaint at ¶ 4, Colo. River Ecosystem v. Colorado, No. 1:17-cv-
02316, 2017 WL 4284548 (D. Colo. Sep. 25, 2017); Walker, supra note 103 
(explaining the trajectory of the lawsuit). 
 181. See Walker, supra note 103 (reporting on the lawyer’s threats of 
sanctions and disbarment from the Colorado Attorney General’s Office). 
 182. See Ben Zimmer, Where did the Supreme Court get its ‘Parade of 
Horribles’, BOSTON GLOBE (July 1, 2012), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2012/06/30/where-did-supreme-court-get-
its-parade-horribles /Y0jnIscamtgPEzO0PdtL9N/story.html (explaining the 
origins and providing examples of the “parade of horribles” expression in legal 
analysis) 
 183. See id. 
 184. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 558 (2012) 
(explaining the courts concern that upholding the individual mandate of the 
Affordable Care Act on the basis of commerce clause grounds would expand 
Congress’ power to the point that it could mandate individual’s purchase 
broccoli for their “own sake”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Dep’t of 
Health & Human Services v. Florida, (No. 11-398) (U.S. 2012), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2011/11-
398-Tuesday.pdf (“JUSTICE SCALIA: Could you define the market—everybody 
has to buy food sooner or later. So, you define the market as food; therefore, 
everybody’s in the market; therefore, you can make people buy broccoli.”). 
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B. ESTABLISHING STANDING THROUGH VALUATIONS OF 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES. 
Because of the difficulties plaintiffs face in establishing a 
sufficient injury-in-fact under the standing doctrine, litigators 
should look to ESVs to fill in the gaps and compliment their 
standing claims. As James Salzman stated in 1997, “[a]s our 
understanding of ecological services develops, however, it well 
may be possible with a degree of certainty to establish 
connections between identifiable injuries and specific harms 
to services such as pollination or water retention.”185 Twenty-
two years later, we are now at a point where that degree of 
certainty can be established. 
i. By valuing lost or damaged ecosystem services a plaintiff 
can establish an actual or imminent and concrete and 
particularized injury-in-fact. 
In an article that compiled cases in common law countries 
that discussed ecosystem services (either by name or theory) the 
authors made the recommendation that all ecosystem service 
based standing claims use the terminology only to refer to an 
already legally cognizable interest—such as aesthetics, 
recreation, or existence values.186 “[R]eframing recognized 
protected environmental interests as ecosystem services holds 
more potential than introducing novel ecosystem services-based 
legal theories.”187 Despite this warning, this Note proposes the 
use of ecosystem service valuation methodologies as a tool to link 
damages to ecosystem services to an “actual or imminent” and 
“concrete and particularized” injury-in-fact. Instead of creating 
a novel ecosystem services based legal standing theory, this 
approach merely applies an already well accepted analytical 
framework to a new area of the law. Ecosystem service valuation 
methodologies, models, and platforms address some of the 
limitations found in the common standing legal theories because 
it puts environmental harms into a language courts already 
understand—monetary damages.188 
                                                        
 185. Salzman, supra note 12, at 901. 
 186. Sharon et al., supra note 112, at 14. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Civil litigation often involves lawsuits centered around claims for 
monetary damages stemming from tort claims, contract breaches, and the like. 
See, e.g., WEINBERG, supra note 44, § 11B.03(1) (“Standing to institute a legal 
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a. Actual or Imminent Injury 
The first thing to establish in a standing analysis is an 
actual or imminent injury that is not conjectural or 
hypothetical.189 Using ESV methodologies and platforms 
described in this Note190 a plaintiff can link conduct by the 
defendant to actual injuries stemming from a loss of ecosystem 
services in the present moment, even if some of the effects will 
happen in the future. For example, coastal habitats can act as 
buffer zones to provide flood prevention and protection from 
storms.191 The development of these buffer zones can increase 
the severity, likelihood, and frequency of flooding and resulting 
damages.192 
A plaintiff who owns property in a flood plain that was 
protected by coastal habitats that were subsequently developed 
can allege a loss in flood mitigation benefits that the coastal 
habitat provided to their property using an ESV approach.193 
The plaintiff can then convert the loss of flood protection into 
actual monetary damages.194 An ESV approach thus allows the 
plaintiff to allege her injury in the form of a lost pecuniary 
interest in the present. This saves the plaintiff from having to 
argue that her injury-in-fact is based on an increased risk of 
harm occurring—an argument which has not fared well in the 
court system.195 
                                                        
action is a vital issue in environmental litigation, where plaintiffs often lack the 
pecuniary injury that furnishes standing in most civil litigation.”). 
 189. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 190. See supra Part I.D.iii. 
 191. See NAT. CAPITAL PROJECT, INVEST USER GUIDE: COASTAL 
VULNERABILITY MODEL, http://data.naturalcapitalproject.org/nightly-
build/invest-users-guide/html/coastal_vulnerability.html (last visited Jan. 25, 
2019) [hereinafter INVEST: COASTAL VULNERABILITY MODEL] (“Natural 
habitats . . . play a vital role in decreasing the impacts of coastal hazards that 
can erode shorelines and harm coastal communities.”). 
 192. INVEST: COASTAL VULNERABILITY MODEL, supra note 192 
(“[I]ncreases in anthropogenic pressure can lead to the loss and degradation of 
coastal ecosystems and their ability to provide protection for humans during 
storms.”). 
 193. See e.g., id. (providing a model to calculate the lost protection coastal 
ecosystem provides following their development or degradation). 
 194. See id. 
 195. See Fero v. Excellus Health Plan, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 735, 753 (holding 
that increased risk of future identity theft was not an “actual or imminent” or 
“concrete” injury). 
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Although ESVs can help prove a plaintiff is a lot closer to an 
actual or imminent injury, it still has its temporal limits. For 
example, certain damages from climate change will not happen 
until a hundred or more years from now.196 Attempts to protect 
future generations from these harms by linking the degradation 
of ecosystems to a loss in carbon sequestration benefits these 
future generations will not receive will likely be too much of a 
temporal stretch for a court to accept.197  
The D.C. Circuit Court highlighted this issue in Wildearth 
Guardians v. Salazar.198 Plaintiffs attempted to challenge the 
government’s decision to lease public lands for coal mining 
operations based on the impact the increased greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHGe) would have on climate change.199 However, 
the Court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove a demonstrable 
increase in risk to their recreational, aesthetic, or economic 
interests based on the government’s actions because the harm 
would occur sometime in the future and depended “on the 
behavior of countless third parties.”200 Therefore, while ESV can 
provide a useful tool in many cases to allege standing, it is not 
without its own limitations. 
b. Concrete Injury 
For another illustration that was given by J.B. Ruhl in his 
speech at St. Thomas University Law School’s distinguished 
speakers series—imagine a plaintiff owns and operates a 
commercial apple orchard.201 Next to the apple orchard is a 
significant portion of undeveloped land that contains natural 
                                                        
 196. Future of Climate Change, U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climate-change-science/future-climate-
change_.html (last updated Dec. 27, 2016) (explaining the potential impacts of 
climate change 100 years from now). 
 197. Cf. Fero, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 753. 
 198. 880 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 199. Id. at 79, 84. 
 200. Id. at 85–86. 
 201. J.B. Ruhl, Towards of Common Law of Ecosystem Services, 18 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 1, 15 (2008) (explaining how ecosystem services could be used 
in nuisance suits: “Lawyers through the ages have had no problem agreeing 
that odors from a pigsty, or fumes from a copper smelting plant, or chemical 
pollution of a lake or stream are within the ballpark of nuisance so defined. Why 
should matters be any different when one person’s use of land severs the flow 
of economically valuable ecosystem services to another person’s use of land?”). 
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plant species and habitat that supports pollinators like bees.202 
If this property is purchased by a developer that plans to turn 
the undeveloped land into a residential complex, the apple 
orchard could lose incredibly important ecosystem services from 
the resulting loss of pollinators.203 Harnessing existing ESV 
platforms, the plaintiff’s potential damages can be measured as 
a reduction in apple yield and the lost revenue from this reduced 
crop yield.204 
The Natural Capital Project already has a “pollinator 
abundance: crop pollination” model that can be used to measure 
reduced crop yields based on the change in pollinator habitat on 
its open source platform.205 As the InVEST model user guide 
explains: 
The InVEST pollination model focuses on wild bees as a key animal 
pollinator. It uses estimates of the availability of nest sites and floral 
resources within bee flight ranges to derive an index of the abundance 
of bees nesting on each cell on a landscape (i.e., pollinator supply). It 
then uses floral resources, and bee foraging activity and flight range 
information to estimate an index of the abundance of bees visiting each 
cell. If desired, the model then calculates a simple index of the 
contribution of these bees to agricultural production, based on bee 
abundance and crop dependence on pollination. The results can be used 
to understand changes in crop pollination and crop yield with changes 
in land use and agricultural management practice.206 
With a quantified value of lost apple yields, the plaintiff has 
proof of an imminent injury that would actually occur as soon as 
the defendant develops the property. 
Despite the strong private property rights recognized in the 
United States, individuals do not have a right to invade the 
enjoyment and use of others property.207 With an ESV in hand, 
                                                        
 202. Id. (laying out a hypothetical scenario comparing traditional nuisance 
suits effecting apple orchards—e.g., emissions damaging the bark of trees from 
a neighboring industrial facility—to scenarios, including the one described 
above, involving a loss of ecosystem services). 
 203. Id. See THE NATURAL CAPITAL PROJECT, INVEST USER GUIDE: 
POLLINATOR ABUNDANCE: CROP POLLINATION USER GUIDE, INVEST, 
http://data.naturalcapitalproject.org/nightly-build/invest-users-
guide/html/croppollination.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2019) (“For bees to persist 
on a landscape, they need two things: suitable places to nest, and sufficient food 
(provided by flowers) near their nesting sites.”) [hereinafter INVEST: 
POLLINATOR ABUNDANCE]. 
 204. INVEST: POLLINATOR ABUNDANCE, supra note 204. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See Nuisance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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the owner of the apple orchard would be able to bring a nuisance 
lawsuit against the defendant alleging a specific injury-in-fact to 
their crop yield. Even if the court did not grant an injunction 
against the defendant from developing their property, they could 
require the defendant to offset the plaintiff’s harm through 
compensation.208 If standing had been used by the defendant to 
keep the apple orchard owner out of court, she would not have 
had a chance to challenge the development through a nuisance 
suit in the first place. 
c. Particularized Injury 
A legitimate limitation to using ESV as a tool to establish 
standing may arise when attempting to allege the last element 
of the injury-in-fact analysis—a particularized injury. As a 
plaintiff gets closer to proving an actual or imminent and 
concrete injury based on loses or damages to ecosystem services 
it may be harder to prove that said injury is particularized. As 
Ori Sharon and her team discussed in their survey of ecosystem 
services in common law, “ecosystem services are diffused and, in 
most cases, benefit a broad, albeit unspecified, group of 
individuals.”209 Plus, as the Supreme Court averred in Friends 
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, it “is not 
injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff” that you 
must show.210 
This line of reasoning is what prevented the plaintiff in 
PEER from establishing standing.211 Mr. Stratford, a member of 
the plaintiff organization, submitted a declaration to the court 
attesting to the aesthetic, recreational, and cultural values he 
gained from Cherokee Lake.212 Mr. Stratford’s concern was that 
                                                        
 208. See Walsh v. Town of Stonington Water Pollution Control Auth., 250 
Conn. 433 (1999) (granting damages to neighbors of sewage treatment plant for 
offensive smell that interfered with their use and enjoyment of the property). 
 209. Sharon et al., supra note 112, at 13. But see United States v. Students 
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 670 (1973) (accepting 
showing of injury and specifically noting that courts should not 
deny standing just because many people suffer the same injury). 
 210. 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000) 
 211. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Schroer, No. 3:14-cv-589-HBG, 
2017 WL 943942, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. 2017) (“Mr. Stratford’s Declaration alleges 
only a generalized grievance and not an actual, individualized injury.”). 
 212. Id. (“My family and I enjoy the beauty of Cherokee Lake every single 
day, both on and off the water. We frequently boat, fish, entertain, and marvel 
at the wonder of the lake.”). 
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the defendant’s failure to comply with its wetland permit 
requirements would reduce the ecosystem services the wetland 
provided to Cherokee Lake and interfere with his “aesthetic, 
recreational, and wildlife preservation interest in [the] river 
system.”213 However, the Court’s real concern was that the 
plaintiff failed to link the loss in ecosystem services to any 
individualized injury in his declaration.214 “As the Defendant 
noted, Mr. Stratford has not explained how he has been injured 
or impacted by the wetland mitigation area.”215 
By applying an ESV approach to standing, Mr. Stratford 
could have alleged with specific detail in his declaration, and 
with supporting evidence, his particularized aesthetic, 
recreational, and wildlife preservation interests in the river 
system that would be affected by defendant’s failure to comply 
with the wetland permit requirements.216 For instance, 
Delaware applied the InVEST model to measure the effect of the 
states predicted future wetland loss on habitat quality and 
rarity in Delaware.217 A similar valuation technique could have 
been used to link the defendant’s degradation of the wetland in 
PEER to a quantified loss in habitat and species diversity. From 
here, counsel would merely have to link this quantified loss of 
wildlife to Mr. Stratford’s particularized interest in observing 
wildlife on Cherokee Lake. 
This analytical approach would likely have assuaged the 
Court’s concerns that there was no connection between the 
                                                        
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. (“Mr. Stratford explains how he utilizes the lake, both for 
recreational use and aesthetic value, but does not explain how the failure to 
mitigate the wetlands affects his recreational use or aesthetic value.”). 
 215. Id. at *6. 
 216. See Wetland Ecosystem Services, RAMSAR CONVENTION ON WETLANDS 
(Aug. 15, 2011), http://archive.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-pubs-info-ecosystem-
services/main/ramsar/1-30-103%5E24258_4000_0 (listing ten ecosystem 
services wetlands provide: flood control, groundwater replenishment, shoreline 
stabilization & storm protection, sediment & nutrient retention and export, 
water purification, reservoirs of biodiversity, wetland products, cultural values, 
recreation & tourism, climate change mitigation and adaptation.). 
 217. See INDUS. ECON., INC., ECONOMIC VALUATION OF WETLAND 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES IN DELAWARE 5-1 (2011), 
http://www.dnrec.delaware.gov/Admin/DelawareWetlands/Documents/Econom
ic%20Evaluation%20of%20Wetland%20Ecosystem%20Services%20in%20Dela
ware.pdf (“[C]onversion of wetland to a non-habitat land may result in “edge 
effects” on neighboring habitats. That is, where wetlands are replaced by land 
uses that fragment or pollute neighboring habitats, broader habitat degradation 
may occur across the landscape.”). 
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defendant’s failure to mitigate the wetland degradation and Mr. 
Stratford’s particularized interest in Cherokee Lake. While 
everyone would have suffered from the lost ecosystem services 
that the wetland provided, by performing an ESV Mr. Stratford’s 
counsel would have been able to show the court the particular 
ecosystem services that Mr. Stratford had an interest in based 
on his recreational and aesthetic use of Cherokee Lake. PEER 
also shows the importance of applying ESV up front in the 
pleading stage as plaintiffs attempt to assert specific concrete 
and particularized injuries in its brief was too little too late for 
the Court.218 
However, there will still likely be environmental harms that 
are so diffuse and do not affect one individual person enough to 
rise to the level of an actual injury-in-fact with or without ESVs. 
Lawsuits arising from climate change damages may provide an 
example based on the diffuse nature of GHGe.219 While some 
individuals may be able to claim a specific injury from climate 
change in the future (e.g. beachfront property owners who will 
lose land due to rising sea levels),220 for many a cognizable 
“injury-in-fact” will remain allusive. 
For example, in Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. 
Department of Interior the non-profit organization attempted to 
challenge DOI’s approval of a five-year program to expand off-
shore oil and gas leasing near Alaska.221 The plaintiffs 
attempted to allege injury from future climate change damages 
in the Arctic stemming from the leasing program.222 The Court 
                                                        
 218. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility, 2017 WL 943942 at *6 (explaining 
that a plaintiff “must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts, which 
for purposes of the summary judgment motion, will be taken as true.”) (quoting 
McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 867 (6th Cir. 2016)). 
 219. Cf., e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106, 2005 
WL2035596, at *1 (N.D. Ca. Aug. 23, 2005) (holding that plaintiffs established 
standing to challenge the defendants’ actions which contribute to global 
warming and continuing adverse environmental impacts). 
 220. See, e.g., Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 
2013) (finding that individual plaintiffs successfully satisfied the first prong of 
specific and concrete injuries by showing, for example, how their properties had 
been damaged by flooding and how their health had been negatively affected by 
climate changes). 
 221. 563 F.3d 466, 471–72 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 222. Id. at 476 (“Petitioners contend that, absent Interior’s approval of the 
Program, the OCS areas at issue would not be subject to environmental impacts 
allegedly brought about by climate change associated with the burning of fossil 
fuels produced under the Program.”). 
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dismissed this claim because the harm to the individual 
plaintiffs from climate change was not more personal to them 
than the rest of the world’s population.223 In the future, models 
may become accurate and valuation methods advanced enough 
that an individual’s damages from climate change can be linked 
to specific GHGe. Until that point, individuals may have to rely 
on states and cities to vindicate their collective damages from 
climate change.224 
ii. Application of ESVs can address limitations found in three 
commonly proposed environmental standing theories. 
Each of the prior environmental standing proposals 
discussed in this Note—traditional standing theory, ecosystem 
nexus theory, and the intrinsic value of nature theory—has its 
merits.225 However, each theory also has limitations that have 
prevented its application across the broad spectrum of 
environmental harms that occur.226 Through proper 
applications, environmental lawyers can use ESVs as a tool to 
help overcome the limitations courts have found with each of 
these common proposals. By tweaking the way an injury is 
alleged, and using tested analytical methodologies, ESVs can 
help prove that a plaintiff has indeed suffered an injury-in-fact 
while still relying on the underlying theory of each proposal. 
a. Traditional Standing Theory 
As discussed supra one limitation under the traditional 
standing theory is the inability of public interest organizations 
to find the “right member plaintiff” for harm impacting remote, 
rare, or unpopular environmental resources or species.227 If a 
potential defendant is harming the environment, courts will be 
                                                        
 223. Id. at 478 (“[C]limate change is a harm that is shared by humanity at 
large, and the redress that Petitioners seek—to prevent an increase in global 
temperature—is not focused any more on these petitioners than it is on the 
remainder of the world’s population.”). 
 224. See Umair Irfan, Pay Attention to the Growing Wave of Climate Change 
Lawsuits, VOX (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-
environment/2019/2/22/17140166/climate-change-lawsuit-exxon-juliana-
liability-kids (providing background on a rise in climate change lawsuits filed 
by states and cities against oil and gas companies for current and future 
damages related to climate change). 
 225. See supra Part I.C. 
 226. See supra Part II.A. 
 227. See supra Part II.A.i. 
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of no service in stopping the damages unless a plaintiff is 
identified whose interests in some way are directly injured by 
the environmental harm.228 However, from an ethical approach, 
environmental resources should not be saved from degradation 
only if they are popular, well-studied, or in the general public’s 
eyesight.229 Applying an ESV methodology to standing, plaintiffs 
will be able to bridge the gap between a harm to a remote area 
or species and an injury-in-fact suffered by the plaintiff. 
Looking to Lujan, Defenders of Wildlife were unable to 
identify a plaintiff whom the court found sufficiently injured 
from the government’s funding of international dam projects, 
despite two plaintiffs’ testimony that they had visited and 
observed endangered species potentially impacted from the 
projects and had future (albeit not concrete) plans to return.230 
Applying an ESV model, potential plaintiffs could measure the 
projected impacts on ecosystem services from the construction of 
the Aswan and Mahewali Dams and demonstrate the negative 
effects the dams would have on their interests by charting, 
measuring, and illustrating the resulting ripple effects across 
the relevant ecosystem. For instance, one ecosystem services 
assessment of a proposed dam in the Mekong showed that “[f]ull 
development of proposed hydropower dams will further reduce 
sediment supply to less than 10% of the natural rate.”231 
Sediment provides vital ecosystem services including the 
prevention of delta erosion where over half of Vietnam’s 
agriculture is grown.232 By identifying and broadening the scope 
                                                        
 228. See, e.g., Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Schroer, No. 3:14-cv-
589-HBG, 2017 WL 943942, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 9, 2017) (citing Friends of 
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)) (explaining 
the injury requirement environmental plaintiffs must demonstrate to establish 
standing to sue). 
 229. See LEOPOLD, supra note 95, at 262 (“A thing is right when it tends to 
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong 
when it tends otherwise.”). 
 230. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–67 (1992). 
 231. Jeff Opperman, Gaining Power but Losing Ground? Balancing 
Hydropower and Sand Supply on the Irrawaddy, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffopperman/2018/03/07/gaining-power-but-
losing-ground-balancing-hydropower-and-sand-supply-on-the-
irrawaddy/#193851503dd3. 
 232. Id. (“The Mekong Delta is home to 17 million people and supports 
phenomenally productive agriculture that grows half of Vietnam’s staple crops 
and 90% of its rice exports. Overall, the Delta underpins more than a quarter 
of Vietnam’s GDP.”). 
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of the potential damages to ecosystem services that could arise 
from a hydropower project—like the Aswan, Mahewali, or 
Mekong River Dams—and then calculating the financial value 
of these lost services, the potential pool of plaintiffs with an 
injury-in-fact grows considerably. 
However, there will be some aspects of nature or species 
that do not provide any benefits to humans in the form of 
ecosystem services.233 There are also species that live in entirely 
closed off ecosystems.234 For these resources, it will be impossible 
to utilize ESVs to find a plaintiff that is sufficiently injured. 
Arguably, this does not mean that these species or isolated 
ecosystems are not worth protecting. However, the court doors 
will remain closed to any case attempting to protect these species 
or ecosystems for lack of an injury-in-fact under the traditional 
standing theory using current ESVs. 
b. Ecosystem Nexus 
Incorporation of ESVs as a tool in standing analyses would 
similarly have helped address the flaws in plaintiffs’ ecosystem 
nexus theory of standing alleged in Lujan. Defenders of Wildlife 
argued that any person who uses any part of a “contiguous 
ecosystem” adversely affected by a defendant’s acts or omissions 
has standing even if the activity is located some distance away 
from the tracts used by the injured person.235 While the plaintiffs 
underlying theory was correct from an ecological standpoint—
DOI’s funding of the Aswan and Mahewali Dams would likely 
have had adverse and widespread ramifications on the 
ecosystem as a whole and impacted persons who used or derived 
benefits from portions of that ecosystem—what was missing for 
                                                        
 233. See, e.g., Jonathan E. M. Baillie & Ellen R. Butcher, Species at a 
Tipping Point, in PRICELESS OR WORTHLESS? THE WORLD’S MOST THREATENED 
SPECIES 24–87 (2012) (providing examples of endangered species that offer no 
benefits to humans). 
 234. For example, the Movile Cave in Romania was sealed off from the 
outside world for 5.5 million years until 1986 when it was discovered. It is full 
of poisonous gasses yet forty-nine different species have been found in the cave. 
It is closed off by the Romanian government because of its danger and only 100 
people have been allowed inside. See Jasmin Fox Skelly, The Bizarre Beasts 
Living in Romania’s Poison Cave, BBC (Sept. 4, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20150904-the-bizarre-beasts-living-in-
romanias-poison-cave. 
 235. Brief for the Respondents, Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 
(1992) (No. 90-1424), 1991 WL 577004, 
at *27 (Aug. 30, 1991). 
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the court was a “nexus” between the adverse effect on the 
“contiguous ecosystem” and the harm the plaintiff suffered.236 
Applying an ESV standing theory, plaintiffs could establish this 
“nexus” and illustrate to the court the exact injury the plaintiff 
is suffering.237 
Once again, the InVEST platform shows how an ESV 
approach could have helped the plaintiffs in Lujan establish 
standing. One of InVEST’s models is the habitat quality model 
which does not directly monetize biodiversity but instead treats 
it as an independent attribute of natural systems that can be 
linked to the quality of the habitat.238 The model has a number 
of defined threats (based on the potential land use or land cover) 
that can be inputted into the assessment to “measure potential 
changes in habitat extent, quality, and rarity on a landscape.”239 
One of the possible threats that can be mapped in the model is 
the impact on habitat from “reservoirs and other running water 
diversions,” both of which result from the construction of 
dams.240 Other studies have also used ESV methodologies to 
determine the impacts of hydropower systems on ecosystem 
services including the social and economic impacts from “altered 
food-chain dynamics, habitat fragmentation, intrusion of 
saltwater, displacement of wetland vegetation by upland 
                                                        
 236. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566 (1992) (citing Lujan v. Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 887–89 (1990) (holding that the ESA does not 
extend rights to “persons who use portions of an ecosystem not perceptibly 
affected by the unlawful act in question.”). 
 237. Salzman, supra note 12, at 901 (“As our understanding of 
ecological services develops, however, it well may be possible with a degree of 
certainty to establish connections between identifiable injuries and specific 
harms to services such as pollination or water retention.”). 
 238. NAT. CAPITAL PROJECT, INVEST USER GUIDE: HABITAT QUALITY 
MODEL, http://data.naturalcapitalproject.org/nightly-build/invest-users-
guide/html/habitat_quality.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2019). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. (listing the number of species currently endangered from the threat 
of reservoirs and other water diversions as 161 and the number threatened as 
240); see also The Pros and Cons of Dams, ARCADIA POWER, 
https://blog.arcadiapower.com/pros-cons-dams/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2019) 
(describing how reservoirs and water divisions from hydropower can damage 
the environment and highlighting how after the Aswan dam was built—one of 
the dams in question in Lujan—”scientists noticed a marked decline in fish 
production around the area, as the amount of nutrients and food was now less 
than before the dam.”). 
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species, disrupted reproductive patterns for fish and wildlife 
species, and loss of coastal mangroves.”241 
If these valuation tools had been available at the time of 
Lujan, Defenders could have established a “nexus” between the 
Aswan & Mahewali Dams construction and the adverse impacts 
the dams would have on habitat extent and quality in the specific 
area of the contiguous ecosystem Kelly and Skilbred used to 
observe the Nile Crocodile, Asian elephant, and leopard, even if 
the dams were located some distance away.242 This would have 
assuaged the majority’s fear that the plaintiffs were alleging 
standing based on their use of a portion of an ecosystem “not 
perceptibly affected by the unlawful act in question.”243 Back in 
1997 Salzman noted there was a potential application for 
ecosystem services to establish the nexus Justice Scalia was 
looking for in Lujan, stating that an “[i]ncreased understanding 
of ecosystem services would . . . justify an ecosystem nexus 
theory of standing.”244 Furthermore, instead of broadening the 
scope of federal jurisdiction in potential contravention of Article 
III and separation of powers principles, the application of an 
ESV methodology merely provides evidence that the ecosystem 
nexus theory is valid under the current standing doctrine. 
c. Intrinsic Value of Nature 
Finally, ESVs can help address limitations in the “intrinsic 
value of nature” standing theory because this methodology puts 
environmental harm into terms courts already understand—
pecuniary or identifiable human interests and monetary 
damages.245 Attempts to grant natural objects standing in their 
own right often fail because the judiciary is a human construct 
created to protect human interests and adjudicate human 
                                                        
 241. RICHARD BEILFUSS, INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, A RISKY CLIMATE FOR 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN HYDRO, ASSESSING HYDROLOGICAL RISKS AND 
CONSEQUENCES FOR ZAMBEZI RIVER BASIC DAMS 33 (2012), https:// 
hub.globalccsinstitute.com/sites/default/files/publications/162713/risky-
climate-southern-african%20%E2%80%93hydro-hydrological-risks-
consequences-zambezi-river-basin-dams.pdf. 
 242. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992). 
 243. Id. at 566. 
 244. Salzman, supra note 12, at 902; see id. at 901 (“As our understanding 
of ecological services develops, however, it well may be possible with a degree of 
certainty to establish connections between identifiable injuries and specific 
harms to services such as pollination or water retention.”). 
 245. See WEINBERG, supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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disputes.246 To address the skepticism U.S. courts have taken 
with the “intrinsic value of nature” standing theory, Hockstad 
proposed that “litigators should present a more compelling legal 
and moral narrative by highlighting human interests at stake in 
the preservation of the natural world instead of downplaying 
humanity’s relationship to the environment in favor of inflating 
the proposed interests of non-human objects.”247 Ecosystem 
services are, by their definition, the benefits that the natural 
world provides to humans.248 Assessments of these ecosystem 
services can help litigators “highlight[] [the] human interests at 
stake in the preservation of the natural world.”249 These 
assessments, or valuations, can then be used to directly link 
damages to the natural world to a human injury in order to 
establish standing. 
The lawsuit recently filed in federal district court that 
attempted to list the Colorado River Ecosystem as a party in its 
own right can serve as a use case.250 In the plaintiff’s complaint, 
counsel sought declaratory relief from the Court that the 
Colorado River was capable of possessing rights similar to a 
“person,” that it had certain rights to “exist, flourish, regenerate, 
be restored, and naturally evolve,” and that these rights 
“establish duties on behalf of the State of Colorado, and all other 
governments, to respect those rights.”251 The plaintiffs then 
requested the Court to declare that actions taken by the State of 
Colorado, including permitting of bulkheads at a gold mine that 
led to a toxic spill, overdrawing water, and the operation of dams 
violates the rights of the Colorado River Ecosystem.252 Despite 
this noble effort, the attorney withdrew the complaint at the 
                                                        
 246. See Hockstad, supra note 36, at 121–22 (conceiving “nature as existing 
for the purpose of human use and therefore, subservient to humanity’s 
interests” and recognizing that the “anthropocentric approach in law [] regarded 
nature as a collection of resources for human use and management”). 
 247. Id. at 127. 
 248. See Carcamo, supra note 104 (“Ecosystem services are benefits that 
ecosystems provide to humans.”). 
 249. Hockstad, supra note 36, at 127. 
 250. Complaint at ¶ 4, Colo. River Ecosystem v. Colorado, No. 1:17-cv-02316, 
2017 WL 4284548 (D. Colo. Sept. 25, 2017) (“Through this action, the Plaintiffs 
are asking this Court to recognize and declare that the Colorado River is capable 
of possessing rights similar to a ‘person’ . . . .”). 
 251. Id. at ¶ 68. 
 252. Id. at ¶¶ 79, 69, 74, 82, 85(d). 
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threat of sanctions from the Colorado Attorney General’s 
office.253 
Advancing this difficult legal theory was not necessary, 
however. The very rights that counsel tried to establish for the 
Colorado River Ecosystem (the right to exist, flourish, 
regenerate, be restored, and naturally evolve) and the actions he 
attempted to hold the State of Colorado liable for all could have 
been achieved by applying ESVs as a tool to support counsel’s 
standing claims. In fact, Earth Economics published an 
expansive and detailed report in 2014 on the value of nature in 
the Colorado River Basin.254 The 117-page report studied the 
“ecosystem services in the Colorado River Basin” including 
“potable water, irrigation water, carbon sequestration, flood risk 
reduction, water filtration, wildlife habitat, soil erosion 
reduction, soil formation, raw materials, food, recreation, air 
quality, and aesthetic value” and calculated “the economic value 
provided by these ecosystems.”255 The total value calculated for 
the eleven ecosystem services throughout the entire river basin 
was $56.5 to $466.6 billion per year, with water supply, and 
water quality totaling $7–28 billion alone.256 
Within this calculated value of billions of dollars are real 
humans who derive these monetary benefits in the form of 
ecosystem services from the Colorado River Basin.257 Surely one 
                                                        
 253. See Walker, supra note 103 (noting that the Colorado Attorney 
General’s Office threatened to impose financial sanctions and the attorney’s 
disbarment “on the grounds that his ‘rights of nature’ case is unlawful and 
frivolous”). 
 254. BATKER ET AL., EARTH ECONOMICS, NATURE’S VALUE IN THE COLORADO 
RIVER BASIN (2014), 
https://wrrc.arizona.edu/sites/wrrc.arizona.edu/files/Earth%20Economics%20C
olorado%20River%20Basin%20ESV%20FINAL.pdf. 
 255. Id. at ii. 
 256. Id. at 54, 56 (table 28) (totaling the low and high values for water supply 
and water quality values inside the 200-foot buffer). 
 257. See Lily Tomkovic, A Brief History of Water Rights of the Colorado 
River, EDUC. AT THE CTR. FOR WATERSHED SCI. (Feb. 14, 2016), 
https://watershed.ucdavis.edu/education/classes/ecogeomorphology-grand-
canyon-2016/flogs/brief-history-water-rights-colorado-river (“Before settlement 
of Anglos in the West, the River provided the lifeblood to numerable indigenous 
tribes. Currently, in addition to providing sustenance to indigenous people, the 
Colorado River provides water to approximately 36 million people, is the host of 
numerous types of recreation-resulting in a revenue of approximately 26 billion 
dollars-and generates power through the hydroelectric plants at Glen Canyon 
and Hoover Dams.”); Tom Philpott, 40 Million People Depend on the Colorado 
River. Now It’s Drying Up., MOTHERJONES (Aug. 4, 2014), 
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of these plaintiffs could have brought forward a suit seeking 
protection of the Colorado Rivers right to exist and flourish 
based on a loss of ecosystem services caused by a defendant’s 
actions. Furthermore, in a lawsuit seeking to hold the State of 
Colorado liable for its acts and omissions related to mining 
permits, dam operation, and excess water allotment a human 
plaintiff could have established standing by proving a monetary 
diminishment in the value of their recreation, potable water, 
irrigation water, aesthetic, or wildlife interests. If counsel for the 
Colorado River Ecosystem had used an ESV approach to 
establish standing instead of attempting to extend standing to 
natural objects based on their “intrinsic value,”258 protection of 
the Colorado River Basin likely still could have been achieved 
without resulting in a withdrawal of the complaint to avoid 
sanctions.259 
One limitation that an ESV standing analysis will still 
struggle with is harm to cultural and spiritual values found in 
nature. For example, to the Ojibwe wild rice is an important 
cultural, spiritual, and sacred resource.260 “There is no way to 
quantify the value of this food to the Anishinaabeg [Ojibwe] 
people—it feeds the belly and the soul, and is a major source of 
wealth.”261 Harms to the environment rooted in cultural and 
                                                        
https://www.motherjones.com/food/2014/08/southwests-water-crunch-even-
worse-we-thought/ (“[T]he Colorado also provides the irrigation that makes the 
desert bloom in California’s Imperial Valley and Arizona’s Yuma County—
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spiritual value will remain elusive to an ESV approach. It is 
important to remember that while ecosystem services and their 
valuations are promising tools in an environmental lawyer’s 
toolbelt, “not everything that can be counted counts, and not 
everything that counts can be counted.”262 
CONCLUSION 
Standing has proven to be on the most allusive doctrines for 
environmental plaintiffs to allege, and a favored defense 
strategy of government agencies, private individuals, and 
corporate entities. Despite the valid separation of powers 
concerns underlying the standing doctrine, federal courts have a 
duty to exercise their jurisdictional powers and should not 
abdicate their responsibility as a foundational pillar of our 
federal government. As Justice Marshall averred “[t]he very 
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every 
individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he 
receives an injury.”263 
However, because of certain characteristics of 
environmental harms, including their often diffuse, latent, and 
rippling nature, courts have struggled with applying the 
standing doctrine when a plaintiff alleges an injury based on 
damage to the environment. Without the judiciary’s acceptance 
of environmental harm as a valid injury, plaintiffs are relegated 
to the political battlefield to seek vindication of their interests 
where their voices are often lost to the tides of large corporations 
and market forces. 
Thankfully, we have arrived at a point in time where 
science, data, and robust assessments of ecosystem services can 
help prove to courts that plaintiffs bringing lawsuits for 
environmental wrongs really have suffered an injury-in-fact. 
Ecosystem services provide a useful framework for alleging an 
injury under the standing doctrine because they identify the 
benefits, and thus the interests, that humans receive from the 
natural world. Application of proven models and valuation 
techniques can place a monetary value on these services. 
Alternatively, ecosystem service assessments can provide proof 
of the “nexus” between the environmental harm and damages to 
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plaintiff’s particularized interest. The use and applications for 
ecosystem services and their valuation have grown considerably; 
it is high time environmental lawyers look to ESV as a promising 
tool for their standing battles as well. 
